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Abstract—Incentive mechanism plays a critical role in privacy-
aware crowdsensing. Most previous studies on co-design of incen-
tive mechanism and privacy preservation assume a trustworthy
fusion center (FC). Very recent work has taken steps to relax the
assumption on trustworthy FC and allows participatory users
(PUs) to add well calibrated noise to their raw sensing data before
reporting them, whereas the focus is on the equilibrium behavior
of data subjects with binary data. Making a paradigm shift, this
paper aim to quantify the privacy compensation for continuous
data sensing while allowing FC to directly control PUs. There
are two conflicting objectives in such scenario: FC desires better
quality data in order to achieve higher aggregation accuracy
whereas PUs prefer adding larger noise for higher privacy-
preserving levels (PPLs). To achieve a good balance therein,
we design an efficient incentive mechanism to REconcile FC’s
Aggregation accuracy and individual PU’s data Privacy (REAP).
Specifically, we adopt the celebrated notion of differential privacy
to measure PUs’ PPLs and quantify their impacts on FC’s aggre-
gation accuracy. Then, appealing to Contract Theory, we design
an incentive mechanism to maximize FC’s aggregation accuracy
under a given budget. The proposed incentive mechanism offers
different contracts to PUs with different privacy preferences, by
which FC can directly control PUs. It can further overcome the
information asymmetry, i.e., the FC typically does not know each
PU’s precise privacy preference. We derive closed-form solutions
for the optimal contracts in both complete information and incom-
plete information scenarios. Further, the results are generalized to
the continuous case where PUs’ privacy preferences take values
in a continuous domain. Extensive simulations are provided to
validate the feasibility and advantages of our proposed incentive
mechanism.
Index Terms—Crowd sensing, data aggregation, privacy
preservation, incentive mechanism
I. INTRODUCTION
THE recent proliferation of portable mobile devices (e.g.,smartphone, smartwatch, tablet computer, etc.), inte-
grated with a set of sensors (e.g., GPS, camera, accelerometer,
etc.), has spurred much interest in mobile crowdsensing [1],
[2]. Due to its advantage in reducing the deployment cost
in large-scale sensing applications, crowdsensing has been
applied to a large variety of areas such as smart transportation,
environmental monitoring, health-care, etc [3]–[6].
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Typically, sensing data collected from participatory users
(PUs) will be aggregated by the fusion center (FC) for data
analytics. To identify public health condition, for example,
FC can collect the daily exercise data from PUs and carry
out data aggregation such as average and histogram. Clearly,
contributing sensing data to FC is costly for PUs, since
resources such as energy and bandwidth will be consumed
and data privacy may be sacrificed. Therefore, they would be
reluctant to participate in crowdsensing without a proper in-
centive mechanism that compensates their cost. Most previous
studies focused on resources consumption for data sensing and
reporting in incentive mechanism design [7]–[9]. Only quite
a few consider PUs’ privacy losses [10], [11] and common
assumption made by these works is that FC is trustworthy such
that privacy merely breaches when FC releases the aggregation
results to the public.
In reality, the trustworthy FC assumption may not hold,
e.g., when FC is compromised by malicious attackers, or
the communication channels between PUs and FC are eaves-
dropped. Very recent work [12] take the first attempt to
remove the trustworthy authority assumption and study how
to trade private data in a game-theoretic model. In [12],
PUs can fully control their privacy by adding well calibrated
noise to the raw data before reporting them. However, the
private data is assumed to be binary, which is not often times
applicable to real-world system. Further, the focus of [12] is on
examining the equilibrium behavior of data subjects such that
data collector have no direct control of them. Different from
[12], this paper aim to quantify the privacy compensation for
continuous data sensing while allowing FC to directly control
PUs.
One challenge in doing this is to reconcile the following
conflict: PUs prefer adding larger noise for higher privacy
preserving levels (PPLs) whereas FC desires better quality
data for higher aggregation accuracy. Another challenge is
to overcome the information asymmetry problem between FC
and PUs, since it is difficult (perhaps impossible) to know
PUs’ privacy preferences. Further, privacy preferences of PUs
are typically heterogenous, e.g., women have higher privacy
preferences about their age than men, and patients are more
concerned about their location privacy, which incur diverse
privacy losses for different PUs under the same PPL. An
efficient incentive mechanism needs to differentiate the diverse
privacy losses of PUs and provide appropriate rewards that
capture their contribution to FC without knowing individual
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PU’s precise privacy preference.
To tackle these challenges, we propose REAP1, an efficient
incentive mechanism based on Contract Theory. By Contract
Theory, FC can add some kind of enforcement to incentivize
PUs by signing specific contracts with them, so that FC has
direct control over PUs. Different contracts should be designed
for different types of PUs, each of which specifies one type
of PPL and the corresponding payment that a PU will receive
if he/she can sacrifice the given PPL. A key concern here
is to design a proper menu of contracts satisfying incentive
compatibility such that all PUs can maximize their utilities
only when they truthfully reveal their privacy preferences.
Specifically, we adopt differential privacy to quantify in-
dividual privacy and (α, δ)-accuracy to measure FC’s aggre-
gation accuracy. Then, the quantitative relationship between
individual PU’s PPL and FC’s aggregation accuracy is derived.
In light that the contribution of each PU to the aggregation
accuracy can be quantified, we design a menu of optimal
contracts that maximize FC’s aggregation accuracy under a
given budget. We first consider the complete information
scenario as a benchmark, where FC knows the precise type
of each PU. This benchmark serves as the best aggregation
accuracy that FC can achieve. We further consider the optimal
contract design in incomplete information scenario where FC
only knows the probability distribution of PUs’ types. Closed-
form solutions for both scenarios are derived. Further, we
generalize our results to the continuous case where PUs’
privacy preferences can take value in a continuous domain.
In such a case, the optimization problem turns out to be a
functional extreme value problem that can be solved by an
optimal control based approach.
The contributions of this paper are there folds:
1) We propose REAP, a Contract Theory based incentive
mechanism, to compensate PUs’ data privacy losses and
hence resolve the information asymmetry issues between
PUs and FC.
2) We adopt proper measures to quantify both individual
PUs’ PPLs and FC’s aggregation accuracy, by which
the quantitative relationship between individual privacy
and aggregation accuracy is derived.
3) Closed-form solutions are derived for both complete
information and incomplete information scenarios. We
also generalize our results to the case of continuous
privacy preferences.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The re-
lated work is discussed in Section II. Section III presents
an overview to the crowdsensing system, and quantify PUs’
PPLs as well as their impacts on FC’s aggregation accuracy.
In Section IV, we leverage Contract Theory to address the
information asymmetry problem and generalize our results
to the continuous case in Section V. Simulation results are
illustrated in Section VI to validate our theoretical results.
Section VII concludes this paper.
1The name REAP comes from REconciling Aggregation accuracy and
individual Privacy.
II. RELATED WORK
Recently, various incentive mechanisms have been proposed
to incentivize users’s participation in moblie crowdsensing
systems. Most of these mechanisms are based on either auction
[10], [11], [13]–[16] or other game-theoretic models [17]–[21],
which aim to achieve different objectives. Specifically, in [14],
[20], the authors aim to maximize the social welfare. The
objective of [17], [18] is to maximize the profit of the platform,
and [16], [21] design mechanisms to minimize FC’s payment.
The basic requirement of these mechanisms is to guarantee
that all users’ cost is compensated, at least in the expectation
sense. Most previous studies only compensate users’ resource
consumption for sensing and reporting data, their privacy loss
is not remunerated explicitly.
Interestingly, Ghosh et al. took the first step to view privacy
as a good and aim to compensate users’ privacy loss in their
seminal work [22] in data mining field. In [22], data owners
bid their privacy loss based on their privacy preference, and the
system chooses a set of users and the corresponding PPLs to
achieve the best statistic accuracy under a given budget. Based
on this work, a few improved mechanisms [23]–[25] have been
proposed, especially consider the correlation between privacy
preference and private data. Most of these mechanisms require
a trustworthy authority, which is not available in most cases.
Recently, Wang et. al. [12] removed the trustworthy authority
assumption in data mining field and proposed a game-theoretic
approach to compensate users’ privacy loss. However, the
private data considered in [12] is always binary bit, which
is not widely applicable in mobile crowdsensing systems.
Further, [12] do not consider the information asymmetry
problem between FC and PUs. Thus motivated, in this paper,
we consider a more realistic crowdsensing scenario where the
FC is untrusted and allow PUs to take full control of their
private data, which take continuous value. Moreover, a novel
incentive mechanism based on Contract Theory is proposed to
handle the information asymmetry problem.
Another line of related work is privacy-preserving mech-
anism design in mobile crowdsensing systems. These works
do not take users’ data privacy into consideration. Instead,
they consider the privacy issue of the mechanism itself. For
example, [26], [27] aimed to preserve users’ anonymity within
the incentive mechanism, and [28] aimed to preserve users’ bid
privacy.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we first present the system overview. Then,
we quantify PUs’ PPLs and their impacts on FC’s aggregation
accuracy.
A. System Overview
The mobile crowdsensing system considered in this pa-
per consists of an untrusted FC, a task agent and a set
U = {u1, u2, · · · , un} of PUs as shown in Fig. 1. Different
from most of the previous works on privacy-preserving data
aggregation in crowdsensing, we remove the trustworthy FC
assumption, since FC may be compromised by malicious
attackers, or the communication channels between PUs and
FC maybe eavesdropped.
The FC aims to collect a set of sensing data from n
PUs, denoted as D = {d1, d2, · · · , dn}, where di ∈ R is a
real number. Then it carries out some aggregation operations,
such as average, max/min, histogram, etc, to abstract some
valuable patterns. For easy exposition, we will investigate the
average aggregation2, i.e., s = 1n
∑n
i=1 di, which constitute a
large portion of currently deployed crowdsensing system. For
example, some map application such as Baidu map collect
GPS data (e.g., location and speed) from mobile vehicles and
conduct average aggregation to monitor the real-time traffic
condition. In the healthcare application, FC intends to collect
PUs’ daily exercise data and conduct average aggregation to
monitor public health condition.
Clearly, the sensing data may contain sensitive information
about PUs. Abuse of these sensitive information may breach
PUs’ privacy. Considering the healthcare application, the ex-
ercise data allow adversaries to infer individual PU’s health
condition or living habit. Therefore, PUs may not be willing
to contribute their raw sensing data due to the privacy concern.
To dispel PUs’ worry about privacy, we propose to allow for
PUs to add well-calibrated noise ηi to their raw sensing data di
before reporting them to the FC, and their PPLs can be strictly
quantified by differential privacy as depicted in Section III-B.
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Fig. 1: Framework of REAP.
However, there are two conflicting objectives in this setting:
FC desires better quality data in order to achieve higher
aggregation accuracy whereas PUs prefer adding larger noise
for higher PPLs (these conflicts will further be quantified in
Section III-C). In this paper, we aim to design an efficient
mechanism to reconcile these conflicts. The framework of the
proposed crowdsensing system is shown in Fig. 1 and the
workflow is as follows:
• Firstly, the task agent announces a sensing task to the FC.
• Incentive Mechanism. Then, FC designs a menu of
contract items (each specifies a privacy-payment pair) that
maximize the aggregation accuracy under given budget,
and broadcast them to all PUs. PUs can choose to sign
any one of the contract that maximize their own utilities.
Once the contract is signed, PUs must report a privacy-
preserving version of their sensing data with the PPLs
2We leave the discussion of other kinds of data aggregations in future work
specified in the contracts. In return, they will receive the
corresponding payments.
• Data Aggregation. Next, after receiving the privacy-
preserving sensing data from PUs, FC conduct average
aggregation on these data.
• Finally, FC return the aggregated data to the task agent.
B. Differentially Private Data Reporting
In this subsection, we adopt the celebrated notion of differ-
ential privacy [29] to quantify individual PU’s PPL and privacy
loss, and then define PUs’ utility function.
Informally, differential privacy guarantees that, after re-
ceiving the observation, the attackers cannot distinguish the
neighboring input with high confidence. Here, neighboring
relationship is an important concept in differential privacy. In
this paper, we adopt the neighboring relationship for continu-
ous value as follows:
Definition 1 (γi-adjacency). Two continuous data di and d′i
are γi-adjacency, if |di − d′i| ≤ γi, where γi is the range of
PU i’s sensing data di.
Then, we can give the formal definition of differential
privacy.
Definition 2 (i-differential privacy [30]). A random algorithm
{A : R→ R|A(di) = di+ηi} achieves i-differential privacy,
if for all pairs of γi-adjacency data di and d′i, and observation
dobs,
Pr[A(di) = dobs] ≤ eiPr[A(d′i) = dobs]. (1)
Intuitively, PU i’s accurate sensing data can be either di
or d′i from an attacker’s view. After adding noise ηi, both
di and d′i can result in d
obs with certain probability. Thus,
an attacker cannot distinguish PU i’s accurate sensing data
with high confidence when he observe dobs. Clearly, smaller
i means higher PPL, since it is harder to distinguish di and
d′i when observing d
obs.
The Laplacian mechanism [31] is the first and probably most
widely used mechanism for achieving differential privacy, it
satisfies i-differential privacy by calibrating the Laplacian
noise parameter based on the following lemma:
Lemma 1. If the Laplacian mechanism is used, i.e., ηi ∼
Lap(0, bi), we can achieve i-differential privacy if bi = γii .
By differential privacy, we can also define PUs’ privacy
loss. According to the utility theoretic characterization of
differential privacy [32], the relationship between the expected
utilities with two adjacent data can be characterized by ei
based on (1). Following [22], the privacy loss can be modeled
as the difference between the utility with true data and the
utility with perturbed data, which is a linear function of i
when it is small. Since ei ≈ 1 + i for small value of i.
Then, we can define PUs’ utility in Definition 3.
Definition 3 (PUs’ utility). Any PUi’s utility is defined as
ui = pi − θii, (2)
where pi is PU i’s reward when he/she contribute sensing
data to FC. θi is the privacy preference of PU i which
indicate how much PUs care about their privacy. Clearly,
different PUs may have different privacy preferences [33], for
instance, patients in hospital have higher privacy preference to
their location than others. Naturally, individual PU’s privacy
preference is private information and unknown to FC, or in
other words, there exists information asymmetry between FC
and PUs.
Notice that we only consider the cost incurred by PUs’
privacy loss in order to ease the presentation in this paper,
meanwhile the result in this paper can be extended to incor-
porate the sensing cost. For instance, similar to [11], setting
PU i’s sensing cost to si, we can rewrite PU i’s utility as
ui = pi − si − ci and define p′i = pi − si to incorporate the
sensing cost in the payment.
C. Privacy versus Accuracy
In this subsection, we illustrate the conflicts between FC’s
aggregation accuracy PUs’ PPLs by deriving their quantitative
relationship.
To quantify the aggregation accuracy of the privacy preserv-
ing sensing data, we adopt the following accuracy definition.
Definition 4 ((α, δ)-accuracy). The aggregation sˆ of privacy-
preserving sensing data achieves (α, δ)-accuracy if
Pr[|sˆ− s| ≥ α] ≤ 1− δ,
where s is the aggregation result of accurate sensing data.
Intuitively, this definition indicates that the aggregation error
is larger than α, with probability at most 1− δ. From estima-
tion’s perspective, α stands for confidence interval and δ stands
for confidence level. Clearly, for a given confidence level, a
smaller confidence interval means better aggregation accuracy.
Thus, we can leverage the confidence interval α under a certain
confidence level to measure the aggregation accuracy, where
a smaller α means better aggregation accuracy.
Then, we derive the quantitative relationship between in-
dividual PU’s privacy and FC’s aggregation accuracy as the
following lemma:
Lemma 2. For a given confidence level δ ≤ 1, the aggregation
accuracy α of the privacy-preserving sensing data can be
found as
α =
√
2γ
n
√
1− δ
√√√√ n∑
i=1
1
2i
. (3)
where i is PU i’s PPL, n is the number of PUs, and γ is
the range of PUs’ sensing data3. The proof can be found in
Appendix A.
Recall that a smaller i and αi means higher PPL and
aggregation accuracy, by examining Formula (3), we can see
that the FC and PUs have conflicting objectives. The FC wants
PUs to adopt lower PPLs, which increases FC’s aggregation
accuracy. PUs want to adopt higher PPLs to better preserve
their privacy, which decrease FC’s aggregation accuracy. In the
next section, we resolve this conflict through Contract Theory.
3Notice that the range of the sensing data should be the same for all PUs
in a specific crowdsensing application, for example, the heart rate of a normal
adult is always in the range 60 ∼ 100 bpm. Thus, all PUs’ γi should take
the same value, i.e., γi = γ, ∀γi.
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM DESIGN: A CONTRACT
THEORETIC APPROACH
So far, we have quantified the conflicts between PUs’
privacy and FC’s aggregation accuracy. In this section, we
introduce the contract mechanism to resolve the conflicting
objectives between PUs and FC.
A. Contract Formulation
Contract theory generally studies how economic decision-
makers construct contractual arrangement in the presence of
information asymmetry, i.e., FC typically does not know each
PUs’ privacy preference θi, and aim to design a menu of
contracts to incentivize PUs to participate in crowdsensing
to maximize the aggregation accuracy. To facilitate later dis-
cussion, we classify PUs into different types based on their
privacy preferences, i.e., the privacy preference of type-i PUs
is θi.
In this section, we consider the case where PUs have finite
types of privacy preference, say k types Θ = {θi, θ2, · · · θk},
and provide some insight to the contract design. We leave
the discussion of the case where θ takes continuous value in
the next section. To facilitate the analysis, we sort PUs’ types
in ascending order, i.e., θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ · · · ≤ θk, i.e., a higher
type of PU has a higher privacy preference. Using Contract
theory, FC designs a contract that specifies the relationship
between a PU’s PPL i and the corresponding payment pi
that a PU will receive if he/she can sacrifice the given PPL.
Specifically, a contract is a set C = {(1, p1), · · · , (k, pk)} of
privacy-payment pairs called contract items. Each PU choose
to sign a contract item (i, pi) and report i-differentially
private sensing data for the payment pi. Once the contract
is signed, a PU must report a privacy-preserving version of
sensing data and FC must reward him according to the item.
Each type of PUs choose the contract item that maxi-
mizes their utilities in (2). FC aims to optimize the contract
and maximize the aggregation accuracy, i.e., minimize α in
(3). Since
√
2γ
n
√
1−δ is a positive constant, minimizing α =√
2γ
n
√
1−δ
√∑n
i=1
1
2i
is equivalent to minimize α =
∑n
i=1
1
2i
.
In the following subsection, we will consider the optimal
contract design under two information scenarios.
• Complete information: The complete information sce-
nario is served as a benchmark, where FC knows each
PU’s precise type, and can offer a specific contract to each
PU directly. Clearly, FC can achieve the best aggregation
accuracy in this scenario, which serves as the upper
bound of FC’s achievable aggregation accuracy in any
information scenario.
• Incomplete information: In the incomplete information
scenario, the FC do not know each PU’s precise type,
but know the distribution of each type, e.g., type-i has λi
PUs. In this scenario, FC should decide and broadcast a
menu of optimal contracts to all PUs, and each PU can
choose the contract that maximize his/her utility.
B. Optimal Contract Design under Complete Information
In the complete information scenario, FC knows each
PU’s precise type. We will leverage the optimal aggregation
accuracy achieved in this case as a benchmark to evaluate
the performance of the proposed contract under incomplete
information scenario. As FC knows each PU’s type, it can
offer a specific contract to each PU directly. In this scenario,
FC only need to guarantee that each PU’s utility is nonnegative
so that they are willing to contribute their sensing data. In
Contract Theory, we call this individual rationality constraint.
Definition 5 (Individual Rationality). A menu of
contracts satisfy Individual Rationality (IR) constraint if they
provide nonnegative utility to all PUs, i.e.,
pi − θii ≥ 0,∀i. (4)
Thus, we can design the optimal contract under complete
information by solving the following optimization problem:
Problem 1.
min
k∑
i=1
λi
2i
,
s.t.
k∑
i=1
λipi ≤ B, (5)
pi − θii ≥ 0, ∀i. (6)
where B is the total budget that FC possesses.
Then, we provide the solution to this optimization problem.
Lemma 3. The inequality in (5)(6) can take the equal sign
simultaneously, i.e.,
∑k
i=1 λipi = B and pi − θii = 0.
It is easy to show that both (5) and (6) can take the equal
sign by contradiction. Given pi, if there exists an optimal
contract that satisfies pi − θii > 0, then we can always find
a larger i to achieve better aggregation accuracy until the
equality satisfies. Similarly, If there exists an optimal contract
that satisfies
∑k
i=1 λipi < B, we can always find a larger pi,
which means larger i, to achieve better aggregation accuracy
until the equality satisfies, which lead to the correctness of
this lemma.
Lemma 3 shows that both IR constraints and budget con-
straint are tight at the optimal solution to Problem (1), which
indicate that the FC can provide a zero utility to each type-i PU
with p∗ = θi∗ and spend all the feasible budget. Therefore,
Problem 1 can be reduced to the following problem:
Problem 2.
min
k∑
i=1
λi
2i
,
s.t.
k∑
i=1
λipi = B, (7)
pi − θii = 0, ∀i. (8)
By solving Problem 2, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. In the complete information scenario, the optimal
contract {∗i , p∗i } is given by
∗i =
B∑k
j=1 λjθ
2
3
j
θ
− 13
i , (9)
p∗i =
B∑k
j=1 λjθ
2
3
j
θ
2
3
i . (10)
The proof can be found in Appendix A. By looking into the
parameters in the optimal contract provided in Theorem 4, we
have the following observation.
Observation 1. Recall that a smaller i means higher PPL,
Theorem 4 shows that the PPL to a type-i PU decreases in
B, and increases in θi, which conforms to our intuition. That
is, more budget can incentivize PUs to choose lower PPLs
to achieve higher aggregation accuracy, and FC tends to buy
less privacy from PUs with higher privacy preference to reduce
payment.
C. Optimal Contract Design under Incomplete Information
In the incomplete information scenario, FC does not know
each PU’s precise type, while the distribution of PUs’ types
is assumed to be known, i.e., type-i have λi PUs. In prac-
tice, the distribution of PUs’ types can be obtained through
questionnaire survey or analysis of the historical behavior of
PUs [34], [35]. Clearly, FC should design an optimal contract
for each type of PUs to achieve best accuracy, but due to
the lack of knowledge about each PU’s precise type, FC can
only broadcast all contracts to all PUs. However, if choosing
the contract designed for other types can bring them higher
utilities, some selfish PUs may pretend to be other types.
To encourage all PUs to truthfully reveal their types, the
optimal contracts should guarantee that choosing the contract
corresponding to their own type can always achieve the highest
utilities. Formally, we define this requirement as incentive
compatibility constraint.
Definition 6 (Incentive Compatibility). A menu of contracts
satisfies Incentive Compatibility (IC) constraint if the contract
designed for type-i PUs brings them the highest utility, i.e.,
pi − θii ≥ pj − θij , ∀j 6= i. (11)
Apart from the incentive compatibility constraint, the con-
tract under incomplete information should also satisfy the
individual rationality constraint in Definition 5. Thus, we can
design the optimal contract under incomplete information by
solving the following optimization problem:
Problem 3.
min
k∑
i=1
λi
2i
,
s.t.
k∑
i=1
λipi ≤ B, (12)
pi − θii ≥ 0, ∀i, (13)
pi − θii ≥ pj − θij , ∀j 6= i. (14)
In Problem 3, there are k IR constraints and k(k − 1) IC
constraints, which makes it difficult to solve the optimization
problem. Next, we show that these constraints can be reduced
to a set of fewer equivalent constraints by the following
lemmas.
Lemma 5. The k IR constraints can be reduced to the
following one constraint:
pk − θkk = 0. (15)
Proof. Notice that we have sort PUs’ type in ascending order,
i.e., θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ · · · ≤ θk, and based on IC constraint, we have
pi − θii ≥ pk − θik ≥ pk − θkk,∀i 6= k.
Thus, if the IR constraint of type-k satisfied, i.e., pk −
θkk ≥ 0, it will satisfied for all other types automatically.
Therefore, we can keep the last IR constraint and reduce
the others. Moreover, if there exists an optimal contract that
satisfies pk − θkk > 0, we can always find a larger k to
achieve better aggregation accuracy until pk−θkk = 0, which
end the proof.
Lemma 5 shows that only the highest type of PUs receive
a zero utility, and lower types of PUs receive positive utilities
that are decreasing in their types. The reason is that FC does
not know each PU’s type, it needs to provide incentives in
terms of positive utilities to PUs to attract them revealing
their truthful types. This is called information loss compared
to complete information.
Lemma 6 (Monotonic Property). If θ1 ≤ θ2 ≤ · · · ≤ θk, then
1 ≥ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ k holds.
Proof. Based on the IC constraint, we have
pi − θii ≥ pj − θij ,
pj − θjj ≥ pi − θji.
Adding these two inequalities result in i(θj−θi) ≥ j(θj−
θi). Thus, we have if θi ≤ θj , then i ≥ j for all i and j,
which lead to the correctness of this lemma.
Intuitively, Lemma 6 shows that a PU with higher type
should be assigned lower PPL, since his unit cost is higher
and the FC needs to compensate this PU more when the
contribution to the aggregation accuracy are the same. Further,
this Lemma can be leveraged to prove the correctness of
Lemma 7.
Lemma 7. The k(k−1) IC constraints can be reduced to the
following k − 1 constraints.
pi − θii = pi+1 − θii+1,∀i ≤ k − 1. (16)
The proof can be found in Appendix A. Lemma 7 ensures
that if the contract item (i, pi) designed for type-i PUs bring
them the same utilities with the contract item (i+1, pi+1)
designed for type-(i+ 1) PUs, all the IC constraints for type-
i PUs are satisfied, which means type-i PUs will truthfully
select the contract item designed for their corresponding type.
Based on Lemma 5 and Lemma 7, we can reduce Problem
3 to the following problem:
Problem 4.
min
k∑
i=1
λi
2i
,
s.t.
k∑
i=1
λipi = B, (17)
pk − θkk = 0, (18)
pi − θii = pi+1 − θii+1,∀i ≤ k − 1. (19)
By solving Problem 4, we can calculate the optimal contract
as the following theorem.
Theorem 8. In the incomplete information scenario, the
optimal contract {∗i , p∗i } is given by
∗i = GH
− 13
i λ
1
3
i ,
p∗i =
{
G(θiH
− 13
i λ
1
3
i +
∑k
j=i+1 ∆θjH
− 13
j λ
1
3
j ), i 6= k,
GθkH
− 13
k λ
1
3
k , i = k,
where
∆θi = θi − θi−1, (20)
Hi =
{
λ1θ1, i = 1,
λiθi + ∆θi
∑i−1
j=1 λj , i > 1,
(21)
G =
B∑k
j=1H
2
3
j λ
1
3
j
. (22)
The proof of Theorem 8 is given in Appendix A. Next,
we compare FC’s aggregation accuracy under incomplete and
complete information scenarios. In Fig. 2, we show the ratio of
FC’s aggregation accuracy under incomplete information and
complete information scenarios when there are three types.
λ1 = 0, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250 correspond to the lines from
bottom to top, respectively. In this figure, we only show λ1
and λ2, and λ3 = N − λ1 − λ2. Other parameters are N =
300, B = 1000, γ = 10, δ = 0.9, θ1 = 1, θ2 = 2, θ3 = 3. The
ratio is a function of PUs’ realization {λi}3i=1 in three types,
which is always larger than or equal to 1, as FC achieves best
aggregation accuracy under complete information scenario. By
analyzing Fig. 2, we have the following observation.
Observation 2. Compared with complete information, FC
achieves worse aggregation accuracy, i.e., larger α, under
incomplete information. The gap between FC’s aggregation
accuracy under two information scenarios is minimized when
all PUs belong to the highest type, i.e., type-3. For fixed λ1,
the gap increases when the number of type-3 PUs decrease
until they reach a small value.
The ratio reaches 1 when all PUs belong to the highest
type, since in this situation, all PUs obtains zero utilities as
in the complete information scenario. When the number of
type-3 PUs decrease, the information loss increase, which lead
to the increase of the gap. However, when the number of
type-3 PUs reach a small value, the effect of information loss
decreases compared to the complete information, so that the
ratio increase.
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
Number of type-2 PUs (62)
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
2
R
at
io
 o
f F
C`
s 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 u
nd
er
 tw
o 
in
fo
rm
at
io
ns
Fig. 2: The ratio of FC’s aggregation accuracy under
incomplete information and complete information as a
function of PUs’ realization in three types, i.e., αIαC .
D. Discussions on Practical Implementation
By solving the above optimization problem, we could
provide a menu of optimal contracts to incentivize all types
of PUs’ participation in crowdsensing. However, PUs’ action,
if cannot be monitored by FC, may deviate from the contract
in practice, e.g., a selfish PU may add noise with higher PPL
than which signed in the contract to achieve higher utility. To
ensure that all PUs generate noise strictly with the PPLs signed
in the contract, we need a trusted app installed in the mobile
device [36]. Once the contract is signed, the noise level would
be controlled by the trusted app, whose PPL can be monitored
by FC.
V. GENERALIZATION TO THE CONTINUOUS CASE
In this section, we will analyze the optimal contract design
when PUs’ types are continuous.
We assume that PUs’ types θ are in the interval [θ, θ],
and the probability density function of θ is h(θ). Similar to
the analysis in the discrete case, FC can design the optimal
contracts by solving the following optimization problem:
Problem 5.
min
∫ θ
θ
h(θ)
2(θ)
dθ,
s.t.
∫ θ
θ
p(θ)h(θ)dθ ≤ B, (23)
p(θ)− θ(θ) ≥ 0, (24)
p(θ)− θ(θ) ≥ p(θˆ)− θ(θˆ),∀θˆ 6= θ. (25)
where (23) is the budget constraint, (24) is the IR constraints
and (25) is the IC constraints.
Notice that the IR and IC constraints in (24) and (25) are
infinite since θ is a continuous value. The infinite constraints
makes it difficult to solve the optimization problem. Similarly,
we first reduce the IR and IC constraints by the following two
lemmas.
Lemma 9. The infinite IR constraints can be reduced to the
following one constraint,
p(θ)− θ(θ) = 0. (26)
Proof. We can derive the following inequalities based on the
IC constraints,
p(θ)− θ(θ) ≥ p(θ)− θ(θ)
≥ p(θ)− θ(θ),∀θ 6= θ.
Thus, the IR constraint satisfied for type-θ PUs implies that
it satisfied for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. Then, we can reduce IR constraint
to p(θ) − θ(θ) ≥ 0. Moreover, if there exists an optimal
contract ((θ), p(θ)) such that p(θ)−θ(θ) > 0, we can always
find a larger (θ) to achieve better aggregation until p(θ) −
θ(θ) = 0, which lead to correctness of this lemma.
Lemma 10. The infinite IC constraints can be reduced to the
following two constraints,
d(θ)
dθ
≤ 0, (27)
dp(θ)
dθ
− θd(θ)
dθ
= 0. (28)
Proof. Based on (25), we can derive the following two local
conditions for type-θ PUs,
dp(θˆ)
dθˆ
∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
− θd(θˆ)
dθˆ
∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
= 0, (29)
d2p(θˆ)
dθˆ2
∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
− θd
2(θˆ)
dθˆ2
∣∣∣
θˆ=θ
≤ 0. (30)
Since (29)(30) hold for all θ ∈ [θ, θ], we have
dp(θ)
dθ
− θd(θ)
dθ
= 0, (31)
d2p(θ)
dθ2
− θd
2(θ)
dθ2
≤ 0. (32)
By differentiating (31), we can simplify (32) as
d(θ)
dθ
≤ 0. (33)
Then, we prove that (31) and (33) hold globally. By inte-
grating (31) from θˆ to θ, we have
p(θ)− p(θˆ) = θ(θ)− θ(θˆ)−
∫ θ
θˆ
(u)du. (34)
Rearrange (34), we have
p(θ)− θ(θ) = p(θˆ)− θˆ(θˆ) + (θˆ − θ)(θˆ)−
∫ θ
θˆ
(u)du.
Since (θ) is non-increasing, we have (θˆ − θ)(θˆ) −∫ θ
θˆ
(u)du ≥ 0. Thus, we can conclude that p(θ) − θ(θ) ≥
p(θˆ) − θˆ(θˆ) for all θˆ 6= θ, which indicate that (31) and (33)
hold globally.
Similar to the analysis in the discrete case, the budget
constraint (23) can take the equal sign, i.e.,∫ θ
θ
p(θ)h(θ)dθ = B. (35)
Then, we can transform Problem 5 to the following problem:
Problem 6.
min
∫ θ
θ
h(θ)
2(θ)
dθ,
s.t. (35)(26)(27)(28).
Notice that Problem 6 is a functional extreme value prob-
lem, we can utilize the optimal control method to solve this
problem.
Let u(θ) = (θ) be the control variable, and let x1(θ) =
p(θ)− θ(θ) be the state variable. Then, we have
x˙1(θ) = p˙(θ)− (θ)− θ˙(θ)
= −(θ) = −u(θ),
where the second equality is due to (28).
To deal with the budget constraint (23), we can define a
new state variable
x˙2(θ) = p(θ)h(θ) = [x1(θ) + θu(θ)]h(θ) (36)
Based on (23), we can derive the following transversality
condition,
x2(θ)− x2(θ) = B. (37)
Thus, the Hamiltonian of the optimal control problem is
H[x(θ), u(θ), λ(θ), θ]
=
h(θ)
u2(θ)
− λ1(θ)u(θ) + λ2(θ)[x1(θ) + θu(θ)]h(θ),
where λ1(θ) and λ2(θ) is the co-state variables.
According to the Euler-Lagrange equation for optimal con-
trol problem, we have the following conditions,
∂H
∂u
=
−2h(θ)
u3(θ)
− λ1 + λ2θh(θ) = 0,
λ˙1(θ) = − ∂H
∂x1
= −λ2h(θ),
λ˙2(θ) = − ∂H
∂x2
= 0.
Thus, we can calculate the co-state variables as,
λ2(θ) = c1,
λ1(θ) = −c1H(θ) + c2,
where c1 and c2 are constants which can be calculated by the
transversality conditions (37)(26).
Then, we the optimal contract [∗(θ), p∗(θ)] is given by,
∗(θ) = u∗(θ)
= 3
√
2h(θ)
c1θh(θ)− c1H(θ)− c2 ,
p∗(θ) = x1(θ) + θ(θ)
= θ∗(θ)−
∫ θ
θ
∗(τ)dτ.
TABLE I: Simulation settings
Parameter Value
Number of PUs (N ) 200
Privacy preference (θ) [5, 15]
Number of PUs’ types Feasibility 20
(k) Performance [5, 20]
Budget constraint Feasibility 1000
(B) Performance [500, 1000]
VI. SIMULATION STUDIES
In this section, we first validate the feasibility of the
proposed contracts, and then analyze the impact of different
system parameters on the aggregation accuracy.
The simulation settings are shown in Table I. We assume
there are 200 PUs and their privacy preferences are from
5 to 10 in both simulations. For simplicity, we consider a
uniform distribution of PUs’ privacy preference. To illustrate
the feasibility of the proposed contract, we set the number
of PUs’ types k and the budget constraint B to 20 and 1000
respectively. To evaluate the impact of parameter k and B to
the aggregation accuracy, we set the value ranges to [5, 20]
and [500, 1000] respectively.
A. Contract Feasibility
In this subsection, we illustrate that the proposed optimal
contracts satisfy both the monotonic property and incentive
compatibility property.
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Fig. 3: Contract monotonicity.
Fig. 3 shows that  decreases when PUs’ types increase.
Since a smaller  means higher PPL, Fig. 3 indicates that PUs
with higher type tend to choose higher PPL, which validate the
monotonic property discussed in Lemma 6. Besides, the result
is accord with our intuition that the FC choose to buy less
privacy from the PUs with higher privacy preference to reduce
the payment. In another hand, we find that under the same
budget constraint, PUs’ PPLs under complete information
scenario are lower than which in incomplete information
scenario. The reason is that in complete information scenario,
the FC knows each PU’s precise type, so that the contract
designed to all types of PUs can take zero utilities, as Lemma 3
shows. However, in the incomplete information scenario, PUs’
precise types is unknown to the system. Thus, only the highest
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Fig. 5: Aggregation accuracy Vs. budget constraint.
type contract can take zero utility, whereas other types of PUs’
utilities should remain strictly positive, since otherwise, the
PUs with lower type will pretend to be higher type to achieve
higher utility.
In Fig. 4, we show the utility function of type-5, type-10 and
type-15 PUs when they choose all types of contracts. Notice
that the utility function is concave for all types of PUs, and
each type of PUs achieve their optimal utilities when they
choose the corresponding contract, e.g., type-5 PUs achieve
their optimal utilities when they choose type-5 contract, which
validate the incentive compatibility property. Additionally, we
observe that the PUs with lower type can achieve higher utility
when they choose the same contract. The reason is that the
lower type PUs have lower privacy preference θi, according to
PUs’ utility definition uj = pj − θij ,∀j, a smaller θi result
in higher utility.
B. System Performance
In this subsection, we show the impact of different system
parameters on the aggregation accuracy.
Fig. 5 shows the impact of the amount of budget on the
aggregation accuracy when other parameters are fixed. We
observe that α decreases when the amount of budget increases.
Since a smaller α means a better aggregation accuracy, 5 in-
dicates that larger amount of budget lead to better aggregation
accuracy. The reason is obvious, when the FC possesses more
5 10 15 20
Number of user types
4.6
4.8
5
5.2
5.4
5.6
5.8
6
6.2
6.4
Ag
gr
eg
at
io
n 
ac
cu
ra
cy
 (,
)
Complete information
Incomplete information
Fig. 6: Aggregation accuracy Vs. number of user types.
budget, it can provide more incentive to drive PUs to choose
lower PPL, which lead to better aggregation accuracy.
In Fig. 6, we evaluate the impact of number of PUs’ types
on the aggregation accuracy when other parameters are fixed.
Fig. 6 shows that, the aggregation accuracy decreases with
the number of PUs’ types. Recall the reduced IR constraint
pk − θkk = 0 and IC constraints pi − θii = pi+1 − θii+1,
we can set the utility of higher type PUs more close to 0,
which means less additional payments. Thus, the increase of
PUs’ types lead to more additional payment which decrease
the aggregation accuracy under budget constraint.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we designed an incentive mechanism REAP to
compensate PUs’ privacy loss. Unlike previous mechanisms,
we did not require FC to be trustworthy and allow PUs to add
well calibrated noise to their sensing data before reporting
them to FC. Then, in order to achieve better aggregation
accuracy under a budget constraint, we devised a contract-
based incentive mechanism to induce PUs to lower down their
PPL. Optimal contracts with closed form were derived in both
complete and incomplete information scenarios. Our results
were generalized to the continuous case. Extensive simulations
were conducted to validate the feasibility of our proposed
incentive mechanism.
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APPENDIX
Proof. The aggregation error of the randomized sensing data
can be written as
sˆ− s = 1
n
N∑
i=1
(di + ηi)− 1
n
N∑
i=1
di =
1
n
N∑
i=1
ηi.
Recall that the variance of Laplacian random variable ηi ∼
Lap(0, bi) is 2b2i , i.e., D(ηi) = 2b
2
i , we can derive that
D(
1
n
N∑
i=1
ηi) =
2
n2
n∑
i=1
b2i .
Therefore, from the Chebyshev’s inequality, we have
P [|s− sˆ| ≥ α] ≤ 2
α2n2
n∑
i=1
b2i ,
which indicates that the aggregated randomized sensing data
satisfies (α, 2α2n2
∑n
i=1 b
2
i )-accuracy.
Thus, for a given confidence level δ ≤ 1, we have
α =
√
2γ
n
√
1− δ
√√√√ n∑
i=1
b2i
Substituting bi = γii into the above formula, and set γi = γ
for all i, we derive
α =
√
2γ
n
√
1− δ
√√√√ n∑
i=1
1
2i
.
Proof. Substituting (8) to (7), we have
k∑
i=1
λiθii = B (38)
The Lagrangian of Problem 2 can be written as
L(i, α) =
k∑
i=1
[
λi
2i
+ αλiθii]− αB,
where α is the Lagrangian multiplier.
Based on the KKT condition, we have
∂L
∂i
=
−2λi
3i
+ αλiθi = 0, ∀i.
Solving the above equation obtain i = 3
√
2
αθ
− 13
i . Substitut-
ing this formula to (38), we have
3
√
2
α
=
B∑k
i=1 λiθ
2
3
i
.
Therefore, ∗i is given by
∗i =
B∑k
j=1 λjθ
2
3
j
θ
− 13
i , (39)
Substituting (39) to p∗i − θi∗i = 0, p∗i can be calculated as
p∗i =
B∑k
j=1 λjθ
2
3
j
θ
2
3
i . (40)
Proof. We will conduct the proof of this lemma by three steps.
Firstly, we prove that if pi − θii ≥ pi−1 − θii−1 satisfies,
then pi−θii ≥ pj−θij hold for all j ∈ {i−1, i−2, · · · , 1}.
Based on the IC constraint, we have
pi − θii ≥ pi−1 − θii−1, (41)
pi−1 − θi−1i−1 ≥ pi−2 − θi−1i−2. (42)
Formula (42) can be transformed to the following form
θi−1(i−2 − i−1) ≥ pi−2 − pi−1.
Recall the monotonic property in Lemma 6, we know that
θi−1 ≤ θi and i−2 ≥ i−1. Thus, we have θi(i−2 − i−1) ≥
pi−2 − pi−1 or pi−1 − θii−1 ≥ pi−2 − θii−2. Following the
same step, we have
pi − θii ≥ pi−1 − θii−1 ≥ · · · ≥ p1 − θi1.
These inequalities lead to the correctness of this step.
Secondly, we prove that if pi−θii ≥ pi+1−θii+1 satisfies,
then pi−θii ≥ pj−θij hold for all j ∈ {i+1, i+2, · · · , k}.
Similar to the proof of the first step, we have
pi − θii ≥ pi+1 − θii+1 ≥ · · · ≥ p1 − θi1,
which lead to the correctness of this step. Notice that for an
optimal contract, we have pi − θii = pi+1 − θii+1 holds,
since otherwise, we can always find a larger i to achieve a
better aggregation accuracy until the equal signs hold.
Thirdly, we prove that pi − θii = pi+1 − θii+1 implies
pi − θii ≥ pi−1 − θii−1.
It is obvious that θi(i−1− i) ≥ θi−1(i−1− i), rearrange
this inequality, we have
pi − θii ≥ pi + θi−1i−1 − θi−1i − θii−1.
Since pi − θii = pi+1 − θii+1, then pi−1 − θi−1i−1 =
pi − θi−1i hold, i.e., pi + θi−1i−1 − θi−1i = pi−1. Thus,
we have pi − θii ≥ pi−1 − θii−1.
In summary, pi − θii = pi+1 − θii+1 implies pi − θii ≥
pj − θij ,∀j 6= i, which end the proof of this lemma.
Proof. Based on (18) and (19), we have
pk−1 − θk−1k−1 = pk − θk−1k
= θkk − θk−1k
= (θk − θk−1)k (43)
Let ∆θk = θk − θk−1, we can rewrite (43) as pk−1 =
θk−1k−1 + ∆θkk.
Following the same procedure, we can conclude that
pi =
{
θii +
∑k
j=i+1 ∆θjj , i 6= k,
θkk, i = k,
(44)
where ∆θi is defined by (20).
Then, we have
k∑
i=1
λipi =
k−1∑
i=1
[λiθii + λi
k∑
j=i+1
∆θjj ] + λkθkk
=λkθkk + λk−1θk−1k−1 + λk−1∆θkk
+ λk−2θk−2k−2 + λk−2[∆θk−1k−1 + ∆θkk]
...
+ λ1θ11 + λ1[∆θ22 + · · ·+ ∆θkk]
=k[λkθk + ∆θk(λk−1 + · · ·+ λ1)]
+ k−1[λk−1θk−1 + ∆θk−1(λk−2 + · · ·+ λ1)]
...
+ 1λ1θ1.
Rearrange the above equation by i, we can get
k∑
i=1
λipi =
k∑
i=1
Hii = B, (45)
where Hi is defined by (21).
Thus, the Lagrangian of Problem 4 is
L(, α) =
k∑
i=1
[
λi
2i
+ αHii]− αB,
where α is the Lagrangian multiplier.
Based on the KKT condition, we have
∂L
∂i
=
−2λi
3i
+ αHi = 0.
Then, we can calculate i as
i =
3
√
2
α
(
λi
Hi
)
1
3 (46)
Substituting (46) to (45), we obtain
3
√
2
α
=
B∑k
j=1H
2
3
j λ
1
3
j
Thus, the optimal contract ∗i is given by
∗i =
B∑k
i=1H
2
3
i λ
1
3
i
H
− 13
i λ
1
3
i (47)
Then, we can calculate the k-th contract as,
p∗k = θk
∗
k =
B∑k
j=1H
2
3
j λ
1
3
j
θkH
− 13
k λ
1
3
k .
Substitute (47) to (44) and rearrange, we can achieve other
contracts when i 6= k.
